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not informed by international comparisons, and based on the sources from all
relevant countries and languages.” True
to his word, Nicholas Rodger has produced essays here that fully reflect that
view, the hallmark of the effectiveness
and originality of his work.
Among the several important and broadranging essays are “The New Atlantic:
Naval Warfare in the Sixteenth Century”; “Form and Function in European
Navies, 1660–1815”; and “Navies and
the Enlightenment”—broad overviews
of the changing nature of warfare at sea
and the differing types of navies that
characterized those periods. Rodger’s
essays “Cnut’s Geld and the Size of
Danish Ships,” “The Military Revolution at Sea,” and “The Development of
Broadside Gunnery, 1450–1650” show
consideration of specific general issues.
“Weather, Geography and Naval Power
in the Age of Sail” should be basic reading for everyone approaching the age of
fighting sail for the first time.
Other selections deal with interpretations of specific aspects of British history, such as “The Naval Service of the
Cinque Ports,” “Queen Elizabeth and
the Myth of Sea-Power in English History,” and “Mutiny or Subversion?
Spithead and the Nore.” A number of
such essays neatly summarize the state
of knowledge on topics that deserve
much greater, in-depth research, and
analysis than they have received.
Among these are two essays on naval
medicine in the light of broader medical development, one on naval chaplains, and another on the broad
development of naval education. To
these Rodger has added his own detailed research contribution to a neglected topic—a statistical analysis of
commissioned officers’ careers between
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1660 and 1815. Previously published in
an electronic journal, having this article
readily available in print is most welcome, despite the absence of some of
the original graphs.
All in all, this book is recommended to
every naval historian. While the price is
sadly far beyond reason for individuals,
librarians should make a point of acquiring it for their permanent
collections.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF

Naval War College

Dietl, Wilhelm. Schattenarmeen: Die Geheimdienste
der islamischen Welt (Shadow Armies: The Secret
Services of the Islamic World). St. Pölten: Residenz
Verlag, 2010. 300pp. $31.90

This is a timely book, given the current
revolutions unfolding across the Middle
East and North Africa, where local intelligence and security services have
been a major focus of public anger, fear,
and resentment. Across the region, in
regimes of all ideological stripes, the secret police agency (the dreaded mukhabarat) has long served as a pillar. These
services have a well deserved reputation
for brutality, sometimes even effectiveness, yet their murky operations have
long remained shrouded in whispered
myth. The fall of the secret police services, especially in Egypt, where the pervasive mukhabarat had long been the
stoutest defender of the Mubarak regime, has begun to open the door on
what the spies have been up to.
Dietl, who promises to reveal secrets
about what has really been going on,
has the right credentials to do so, knowing both the region and the world of espionage; yet he himself is the subject of
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much speculation and controversy. For
years before his cover was blown in
2005, Wilhelm Dietl reported on events
from across the Islamic world for quality European media outlets. It was then
revealed that he was an operative for
the German Federal Intelligence Service
(the BND), which has long had a strong
presence in the Middle East. Most controversially, Dietl had spied on fellow
journalists for the BND, a revelation
that tarred his reputation and caused a
major political scandal in Germany.
This book (unable to find a publisher in
Germany, it was instead put out by a
small Austrian firm) may be seen as an
effort at redemption.
Certainly the expected spy stories are
here in abundance, presented against
the background of a “new Cold War”
between the West and the Islamic
world. Schattenarmeen begins with a
long and detailed chapter on the nefarious activities of revolutionary Iran’s
clandestine dirty work, going back to
1979. This is a nasty saga that includes
details about assassinations by Tehran’s
spies of dissidents abroad, in a long list
of countries. It is fitting that Dietl devotes so many pages to Iran’s intelligence services, since they have been
active in Germany for many years, including involvement in high-profile
killings of dissidents.
There are similar but shorter chapters
on bad behavior by Syria and Libya,
both of which have employed their
spies to kill and intimidate enemies
abroad. The chapter on Egypt is unsatisfactorily thin, given the importance of
the mukhabarat in the now-fallen regime, and the discussion of Saudi Arabia is equally perfunctory. Particularly
unsatisfying is Dietl’s presentation of
Iraqi activities before 2003; Saddam’s
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secret services enjoyed an evil reputation across the region for repression at
home and dirty work abroad, yet one
finds only a general discussion of the
role of the intelligence and security services in Saddam’s complex and sordid
regime. Considering the avalanche of
materials now available on the Iraqi
mukhabarat, thanks in no small part to
U.S. government efforts to declassify
and release thousands of pages of captured files, this omission is troubling
and perhaps revealing.
Dietl’s presentation of terrorist groups,
with an analysis of secret alliances with
intelligence services across the region,
is an amalgam of assertions and
speculation—little of it new. Asking
important questions about the exact role
of Islamic secret agencies behind such
groups as Hizballah and Hamas (which
too few Western journalists have been
willing to do) is to be encouraged, but
the information offered here lacks specificity and, above all, sourcing.
Throughout, it is impossible to tell
from where Dietl gets his information.
He talks about “insider sources” yet
provides no footnotes, even to anonymous sources. Given the controversial
nature of many of his assertions, this
does not pass journalistic, much less academic, muster. The short bibliography
of “recommended literature” is a pedestrian collection of secondary sources
(none in local languages), some of dubious reliability, that would be known
to any student of the topic.
The omission of any discussion of Algeria is especially curious, since that unfortunate country has experienced the
worst jihad-inspired insurgency of any
Islamic state in recent memory. It has
been a bloody conflict, killing some
200,000 Algerians since 1992, and it is
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still in progress. Considering that Algerian intelligence has been exceptionally
successful at fighting terrorists, employing clandestine methods that are brutal
and nefarious even by regional standards, the absence of any analysis of Algeria cannot be explained.
In the end, Schattenarmeen is really a
collection of spy stories, many of them
of questionable provenance, and lacks
much overarching analysis. The stories
are entertaining and, based on this reviewer’s experiences, essentially true;
however, they are not a serious treatment of an important subject. Instead,
Dietl has added to the unfortunate
genre of terrorism books, marred by
unattributed revelations, inadequate
analysis, and overheated rhetoric. The
major role played by Middle Eastern intelligence agencies in security matters
and nearly all regional politics is poorly
understood in the West and demands
detailed analysis. This is not the book to
fill that need.
JOHN R. SCHINDLER

Naval War College

Mueller, John. Atomic Obsession: Nuclear
Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda. Oxford,
U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011. 319pp. $27.95

John Mueller has written an extensive
body of work on national security issues, work that runs counter to the conventional wisdom. Atomic Obsession, a
broad examination of the limited role
nuclear weapons have played in history,
examines the prospects for a terrorist’s
acquisition and use of a nuclear device.
Mueller argues that the expense of these
nuclear arsenals (perhaps as high as ten
trillion dollars over the course of the
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entire Cold War, by one estimate) was
not worth it. He contends that the
memory of World War II, great-power
“contentment,” and fear of conventional escalation were enough to prevent the Cold War from going hot. He
cites historian Adam Ulam as stating
that Stalin “had great respect for the
United States’ vast economic and hence
military potential, quite apart from the
bomb.”
On the specter of proliferation, Mueller
points out that decades of predictions
of an imminent cascade of new members in the nuclear club have not been
borne out, that warnings by Herman
Kahn that Japan would “unequivocably”
have an arsenal by 1980 (and similar
predictions concerning a unified Germany) have not come to pass. Mueller
documents what he says is a sixty-year
history of nuclear alarmism, arguing
that this is the light in which we should
view current concern about proliferation.
The most engaging aspect of this important book is its section on nuclear
terrorism. Mueller, to my mind, demolishes the casually constructed conventional fears on the subject. Even rogue
regimes are highly unlikely to transfer
one of these expensive (and laboriously
acquired) weapons even to a trusted independent group, because of the potential for extreme danger to the state. AlQa‘ida, the “chief demon group” in this
regard, is trusted by no one; its “explicit
enemies group includes not only Christians and Jews, but all Middle Eastern
regimes.”
Mueller documents how remarkably
difficult nuclear weapons are to steal
and use. Not even all weapons designers
are familiar with modern security safeguards, such as conventional explosives
within a nuclear weapon that render the
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